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THE CONSTITUTION AS SUICIDE PACT
Saikrishna Prakash *
INTRODUCTION
Michael Paulsen has written a wonderful, creative article.' In his
characteristically engaging manner, he argues that we ought to em-
ploy a "meta-rule of construction" and consistently construe the Con-
stitution to avoid "constitutional implosion."2 Where such "saving"
constructions are impossible, however, the law of self-preservation
must take precedence.3 Priority must "be given to the preservation of
the nation whose Constitution it is, for the sake of preserving constitu-
tional government over the long haul, even at the expense of specific
constitutional provisions."'4 Professor Paulsen does not thereby coun-
tenance constitutional "violations," at least in his own mind. To en-
gage in regime and constitutional preservation, even at the expense of
particular constitutional provisions, is to act consistent with the Consti-
tution rather than contrary to it. According to Professor Paulsen, the
Constitution contains a general self-preservation exemption (the rule
of necessity) to its seemingly iron-clad prohibitions and rights.5
Who favors constitutional suicide? More accurately, who favors a
constitution that lacks an emergency provision authorizing the Presi-
dent to suspend some or all of its parts? Let me be the first to fall on
my sword. Though I count myself as one of the many admirers of
Professor Paulsen's work, I do not believe that he has made his case, at
least not yet. I question whether the Constitution contains a "meta-
rule of construction" which requires that the "Constitution should be
construed, where possible, to avoid constitutionally self-destructive re-
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Visiting Professor of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law, Spring 2004. Thanks to Steve Calabresi, Mike
Kennedy, Andy Koppelman, and John McGinnis for excellent comments and
suggestions.
1 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
1257 (2004).
2 Id. at 1257.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1258.
5 Id. at 1280-81.
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suits." 6 Moreover, I doubt that the Constitution grants the President a
latent and more powerful authority to sacrifice constitutional provi-
sions in order to preserve and defend the Constitution and nation as a
whole. In my view, though the Constitution creates a powerful chief
executive, it does not empower the President to suspend the Constitu-
tion in order to save it.
My disagreements are on four levels. Professor Paulsen regards it
as obvious that any constitution without a rule of necessity is deeply
flawed.7 Given the crises that were sure to buffet a young and weak
nation (which is precisely what America was in 1789), it would have
been foolish and inconceivable to omit a rule of necessity by which
the Constitution's many constraints could be relaxed or eliminated in
times of dire need. Surely the Constitution's makers would not have
bequeathed us a patently faulty patrimony, or so his argument goes.
As strange as this may sound to Professor Paulsen, I do not regard
it at all obvious that people framing a constitution would include an
"anti-suicide" provision. In fact, there are many sound reasons why
reasonable people might omit a rule of necessity. To begin with, con-
stitutional framers might value other things, like religious freedom or
a slavery prohibition, more than the durability of the constitution and
the nation. In particular, constitutional framers might not wish to
frame a constitution that permits the expedient sacrifice of such prin-
ciples, even temporarily. Moreover, constitution-makers might believe
that officials will violate the constitution on grounds of necessity any-
way, and that we ought not to multiply those violations by explicitly
sanctioning what otherwise might occur once in a blue moon.
Second, Professor Paulsen's meta-rule of construction has several
disquieting features. Conventional rules of construction generate a
single meaning, yet Professor Paulsen's meta-rule contemplates that a
single provision might mean many different things. Indeed, the meta-
rule of construction makes it possible for an ambiguous constitutional
provision to mean two opposite things depending upon the emer-
gency context. Moreover, the meta-rule apparently lacks any basis in
the Constitution itself, thus suggesting that it is an extraneous device
deployed in order to achieve some desirable set of outcomes. But
there are many rules of construction that one might wish to apply to
the Constitution in order to achieve some desirable outcome, and it is
not obvious why we should engraft this extra-constitutional rule of
construction and not others.
6 Id. at 1267.
7 Id. at 1258.
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Although I think Professor Paulsen's claim ultimately rests on the
historical understanding of executive power, there are several textual
and structural reasons to suppose that the Constitution lacks the rule
of necessity. As a textual matter, neither the executive power 8 nor the
Oath Clause9 appears to encompass the power to "suspend" constitu-
tional constraints on the federal government. As Professor Paulsen
admits, the latter clause does not grant power. 10 Instead, it creates a
duty. The former clause grants powers-but among the powers which
we know it grants are the power to execute statutes,1 1 a power in se-
vere tension with a supposed power to suspend higher law provisions
found in the Constitution. Structurally, there are clauses which con-
tain "emergency" exemptions of various sorts, such as the Third
Amendment.' 2 There are other clauses that conspicuously lack this
flexibility, seemingly creating absolute commands or prohibitions. 13
The existence of clause-specific, mini rules of necessity suggests that
the Constitution probably lacks a constitution-wide rule of necessity.
Moreover, if we read the entire Constitution as subject to balancing
during emergencies and the like, we transform all the seemingly abso-
lute constraints into mushy, conditional fetters, and also render super-
fluous the explicit flexibility that the Constitution actually cedes to the
federal government.
Finally, I know of no history suggesting that the executive branch
or governments generally were given the constitutional power to sus-
pend their constitutions in times of crisis. English history, at least,
8 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
9 "Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following
Oath or Affirmation:-'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'" Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
10 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1263 n.14.
11 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REv. 701, 713-42 (arguing that Executive Power Clause provides a textual basis for the
presidential power to execute statutes).
12 "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S.
CONST. amend. III (emphasis added).
13 To take just one of many examples, the Sixth Amendment contains several
categorical guarantees:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed ... and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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suggests that chief executives enjoyed no such power. The English
Crown was specifically prohibited from suspending and dispensing
the law. 14 Yet Professor Paulsen argues that the American chief execu-
tive could (must?) suspend the entire Constitution in order to pre-
serve it and the nation it creates.1 5
Nothing said here comes close to proving Professor Paulsen
wrong. The Constitution may have ceded such a power, and (more
likely) there may have been Presidents (prior to Lincoln) who ig-
nored constitutional constraints in emergencies, whether or not the
Constitution authorized such suspensions. Yet if the foundations of
the rule of necessity primarily rest on the alleged implausibility of its
omission, I think there are sensible reasons to think the unthinkable.
Perhaps the Constitution was not meant to endure for the ages where
its "survival" requires the suspension of the Constitution itself.
I. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF SUICIDE
Would it be odd, even daft, to craft a constitution that lacked a
failsafe that enabled someone to suspend some or all of the constitu-
tion's provisions in order to preserve the entire constitutional system
and the nation? Professor Paulsen thinks the answer is obvious-a
constitution simply must have a rule of necessity or it is deeply troub-
led and flawed. 16 I readily acknowledge the potential utility of Profes-
sor Paulsen's rule of necessity. From one perspective, constitutions as
a whole (and not just particular provisions) must be able to bend in
emergencies, not break. If a constitution lacks a generic failsafe, this
increases the likelihood that such a constitution will be abandoned
when some unforeseen crisis strikes the nation. If a constitution does
not have the ability to endure for the ages, many would count its po-
tential transience as a weakness.
Nonetheless, I do not regard Paulsen's first-order, overriding
preference for a permanent constitution as self-evident. The question
14 See ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (U.K. 1689), available at http://www.yale.edu/law
web/avalon/england.htm.
15 Professor Paulsen attempts to draw support for his rule of necessity from the
actions of President Abraham Lincoln. Yet the Constitution's original meaning
should not be discerned in the context of the Civil War, when there were many more
relevant periods in closer proximity to the Founding. For instance, a fruitful area of
further inquiry would be the experiences of the state and national governments dur-
ing the Revolutionary War, the Critical Period, and the Quasi-War with France. For
instance, to what extent were state constitutions, pre-1787, read as containing a rule
of necessity? If the Constitution contains a rule of necessity, the proof will be found
in the experiences of these earlier periods.
16 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1258.
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must be whether reasonable constitution-makers could reasonably
omit a rule of necessity from their preferred constitution. My goal is
to introduce some reasonable doubt about Professor Paulsen's claim
that omission of such a rule would, in his words, be "implausible."
As noted earlier, durability certainly matters. But in many cases
the Constitution's actual provisions matter far more. If, post-Recon-
struction, a resurgent and militarily superior South had demanded
that the Thirteenth Amendment be read as not applying to the South,
could a President have sacrificed the amendment on grounds of ne-
cessity?' 7 Assume that failure to comply with the demand would be
met with a successful secession-the end of the nation. If Professor
Paulsen is right, the Thirteenth Amendment not only may be dis-
carded, it absolutely must be discarded. A President Paulsen could
not act otherwise, given his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution and the nation. Needless to say, many of us might be
willing to see the South go its separate way in these circumstances, and
hence may not see the wisdom of a rule of necessity requiring the
President to sacrifice treasured constitutional provisions.
Or suppose the Constitution clearly declared that life began at
conception and that abortions were illegal. Must we read such a provi-
sion out of the Constitution if doing so will ensure the continued exis-
tence of the nation and the rest of the Constitution? Even if this
amendment somehow received the supermajority necessary for ratifi-
cation, I can imagine many powerful states on the losing side (Califor-
nia, New York) that might prefer to leave the Union rather than live
under such a provision. If the rule of necessity were extant, however,
a President Paulsen must swallow hard and abandon this rather clear
amendment. Under the Paulsenian constitution, it does not matter
how absolute some provision is because every liberty, right, or restric-
tion can be trumped by the logic of self-preservation. Apparently
nothing need remain inviolate, save for the twin principles of constitu-
tional and national preservation.
My point is not that the rule of necessity is somehow revolting.
Instead my point is that while the rule of necessity undoubtedly will
seem attractive to some, it also seems equally clear that there will be
others who value the sanctity of the Constitution's substantive provi-
17 Throughout this Part, I have tried to select hypotheticals designed to target
Professor Paulsen's substantive sympathies and preferences. I want to see how many
"limbs" he is truly willing to sacrifice to "save" the patient. Others will have their own
favored provisions (such as the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clauses, or
the Takings Clause) and in thinking about the rule of necessity's plausibility, they
ought to weigh the temporary or permanent sacrifice of such provisions in the name
of national and constitutional preservation.
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sions above all else. Like the ancient Romans who declared that jus-
tice must be done though the heavens should fall (fiat justitia, ruat
coelum), there will be those who proclaim that the Constitution should
remain inviolate though the government may fall.
Perhaps Professor Paulsen imagines that the Constitution of Ne-
cessity only authorizes temporary suspensions and not permanent
rule-of-necessity-based amendments. After all, Lincoln did not amend
the Constitution-he never permanently sacrificed any constitutional
provisions. Instead, he made a pragmatic judgment that the tempo-
rary suspension of a few provisions might ensure the Union's survival.
But limiting the rule to temporary suspensions still seems rather
troubling. Once again, does the Constitution permit (or even re-
quire) slavery for a decade in order to save the nation, notwithstand-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment? The rule of necessity answer is an
emphatic "yes." And the answer is yes even though there is no guaran-
tee that any crisis will be short-lived. If longer times are necessary to
save the Republic, what stands in the way of suspensions that last "tem-
porarily" for decades? Had the Civil War dragged on for a half-cen-
tury, I suppose Lincoln's temporary constitutional suspensions would
have become semi-permanent and properly so. This is hardly an aca-
demic point. The Cold War lasted almost five decades and the war on
terror will likely last much longer.
More fundamentally, any attempts to cabin the rule of necessity,
to limit it to temporary suspensions, seem "implausible," at least if one
subscribes to its underlying logic. If the rule of necessity only permits
temporary suspensions, it is not really a rule of necessity. There may
well be cases where permanent rule-of-necessity amendments might
avoid constitutional and national collapse, and to the extent that the
Constitution does not permit such amendments the Constitution is a
suicide pact (at least as Professor Paulsen uses the term). Thus I do
not see how one can successfully limit the rule of necessity to tempo-
rary suspensions of constitutional provisions. Either you believe in a
real rule of necessity (including the possibility of permanent rule-of-
necessity amendments) or you are in favor of a suicidal constitution.
The Lincolnesque response to arguments against a rule of neces-
sity is to assert that we all have an incredibly easy choice, a constitu-
tional no-brainer in fact. We must sacrifice the limb to save the life
rather than sacrifice the life to save the limb. At one level, these argu-
ments resonate. Keep your eyes on the prize and don't sweat the de-
tails. But these maxims are question begging in the context of our
[VOL. 79:41304
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Constitution. Is the Thirteenth Amendment1 8 the limb or the life?
And if the Thirteenth Amendment is but a limb, what about a combi-
nation of the Thirteenth Amendment plus the Bill of Rights? Are all
these amendments, taken together, but expendable limbs to be sacri-
ficed for some higher good of national unity? Is religious freedom a
means to constitutional or national perpetuity or an end in and of
itself? I think the answer implicit in the rule of necessity is implausi-
ble. Surely self-preservation of the nation at all costs is not the Consti-
tution's end. Nor is Lincolnesque preservation of the Constitution at
all costs a worthy end, for that would suggest that we may suspend or
discard every constitutional provision to "save" the Constitution. This
is reminiscent of the Vietnam era claim that to save a village, we must
destroy it. Here, if we serially sever limbs on the grounds that the
patient's life is at stake, we run the risk that we will be left with a
lifeless stump. In some situations, at least, it ought to be clear that the
rule of necessity's medicine will be much worse than the disease. Dr.
Lincoln's choice will not always be a no-brainer.
Even if one accepted Professor Paulsen's view that constitutional
and national preservation were the Constitution's alpha and omega,
the rule of necessity would still require difficult tradeoffs. Professor
Paulsen assumes that national and constitutional preservation are in-
separable goals. If you protect one, you necessarily protect the other.
But these goals are not Siamese twins. In many instances, pursuing
one goal will involve the sacrifice of the other. Take the Civil War.
Lincoln's response to secession was to temporarily sacrifice constitu-
tional provisions in order save the Union. But an alternative response
would have been to sacrifice the Union to keep the Constitution invio-
late. Lincoln could have allowed the South to secede and preserved
the Constitution. Once again, which was the life and which was the
limb? One might argue that when faced with the choice between the
Union and the Constitution, Lincoln had a constitutional duty to
choose the latter. He took that all-important oath to safeguard the
Constitution and the Constitution, on its face, neither requires a per-
petual Union nor prohibits secession.' 9
18 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
19 I would argue that Lincoln regarded the Union as paramount over the Consti-
tution. Only this explains his willingness to sacrifice the former for the latter, rather
than the other way around. I am sure that Lincoln and Professor Paulsen believe that
the Constitution created an indestructible union. But here we have explicit provi-
sions (like the First Amendment) colliding with a supposed, implicit constitutional
principle. One common intuition suggests that the specific constitutional provisions
2004] 1305
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Those who agree with Lincoln's choice to prefer the Union over
the Constitution might nonetheless fault the rule of necessity trade-
offs he made. Rather than fighting an uncertain war, Lincoln argua-
bly ought to have sought the South's terms for remaining in the
Union. After all, the outcome of a war would be uncertain-
thousands may die, many more thousands would mourn the loss of
their loved ones, and Lincoln may sacrifice various constitutional
limbs during the course of the war and still lose the patient. So why
not take the prudent, risk-averse course, yield to the South and avert a
civil war? Lincoln temporarily sacrificed many constitutional limbs
without any guarantee that his surgery would save the Union. If he
was willing to sacrifice some limbs up front (say by agreeing to some
constitutional amendments), he might have guaranteed success.
What surgeon operating against the backdrop of the rule of necessity
(preserve the nation at all costs) wouldn't take the guarantee when
both paths likely involve the sacrifice of some limbs? In return for a
provision protecting slavery and the sacrifice of a few constitutional
provisions, Lincoln might have averted a civil war.
Besides the possibility that certain constitutional provisions are
far more vital than the Constitution's (or the nation's) durability,
there are sound structural reasons for omitting a generic, constitu-
tion-wide failsafe provision. If a constitution contains a failsafe that
allows the government to suspend the entire constitution in "emer-
gencies" (however defined), the citizenry runs the risk that the gov-
ernment will continually declare emergencies as a means of evading
constitutional constraints. In fact, one might expect that there will be
crises all the time.
In this regard, consider the lessons learned from Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings. Under that Act (as amended), Congress enacted caps
on discretionary spending.20 But the Act also decreed that so-called
"emergency spending" would not count towards the cap. 2' Taking ad-
vantage of the emergency spending provisions, Congress routinely un-
derfunded programs during the annual appropriations cycle and
thereby nominally stayed under the caps. After the onset of the fiscal
year, however, Congress would predictably pass "emergency spending"
for matters that ought to have been foreseen and funded during the
(such as the First and Fifth Amendments) ought to trump the more general constitu-
tional principle, especially because the latter is only implicit.
20 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C.
§ 901(c) (2000).
21 See 2 U.S.C. § 901(b) (2) (A) (providing that emergency spending would not be
counted in determining whether a sequestration was necessary).
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annual appropriations process. 22 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings created
an incentive to declare emergencies every year, and Congress rou-
tinely used the loophole.
Fears of frequent or continuous emergencies might lead constitu-
tion-makers to refrain from ceding to the government a general right
to suspend constitutional constraints. Given the well understood pro-
pensity for governments to extend their power up to and beyond
rightful limits, constitution-makers might be properly wary of creating
a constitutional "loophole" permitting the easy evasion of constitu-
tional constraints. Justice Jackson cited this very reason in explaining
why the Founders (in his view) omitted a generic emergency power.
"[T]hey suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies. "23
The Articles of Confederation experience provides an extremely
useful data point in judging whether it is implausible for constitution-
makers to omit a rule of necessity. In no fewer than five places, the
Articles proclaimed that they created a "perpetual union."24 Nonethe-
less, the Constitution became necessary precisely because the Articles
were inadequate. In particular, the Articles did not grant the Conti-
nental Congress the ability to regulate commerce or to raise adequate
funds for its operations. To solve this problem, it was thought neces-
sary to amend or replace the Articles. I am not aware of anyone who
concluded that the Articles should be understood as permitting Con-
gress to regulate commerce or levy taxes. Yet the Articles ought to
have been so read if they contained a rule of necessity. After all, at
this moment in history, the Articles and the Nation were at stake be-
cause there was a chance that the thirteen states might rearrange
themselves in smaller federations or that individual states might not
agree to any new national framework. Rather than discovering a rule
of necessity in the Articles, however, statesmen of the era put the Arti-
cles to sleep in favor of a more robust Constitution. That the Articles
were not understood as containing a failsafe, notwithstanding the dan-
22 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS IN THE 1990s, at
19-21 (2001) (discussing how Congress arguably exploited "emergency" loophole in
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573, an Act
that amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).
23 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson,J,
concurring). Justice Jackson also noted that German governments between the
World Wars used an emergency provision in the Weimar Constitution to suspend civil
liberties over 250 times over a thirteen year period. Id. at 651 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
24 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION pmbl. (U.S. 1781) (containing one mention of
"perpetual Union); see also id. art. XIII, cl. 2 (containing four more mentions of "per-
petual Union" or synonymous variants).
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gers facing the Articles and the nation and despite the fact that the
Articles were supposed to last in perpetuity, proves the plausibility of
drafting fundamental frameworks that lack a rule of necessity. 25 If the
Articles clearly lacked a rule of necessity, why must we read the Consti-
tution as containing one?
Of course, we cannot test how popular the rule of necessity was in
1789. But we can test Professor Paulsen's intuition about the rule of
necessity's contemporary appeal. If the Constitution is clearly better
off with a rule of necessity and only the most obtuse of us would op-
pose it, we ought to see if people would favor the rule of necessity (as
Professor Paulsen describes it) as an amendment to the Constitution.
Surely this would tell us something about the plausibility of omitting
the rule of necessity from a constitution created in 1787. At the very
least, we might conduct polls testing Professor Paulsen's hunch about
the supposed appeal of the rule of necessity. I have no doubt that
many reasonable, fair-minded, and intelligent people would embrace
the rule of necessity. But I would be shocked if many others did not
object to the dangers and mischief that might flow from codifying a
rule of necessity. I think that many reasonable people hold a view that
Professor Paulsen regards as "inconceivable" and "near-absurd[ ]."26
Finally, some comments seem necessary on Professor Paulsen's
claim that any constitution is suicidal unless it contains a rule of neces-
sity. Is a constitution that lacks a rule of necessity doomed to crumble
given its lack of flexibility? Professor Paulsen apparently thinks so, but
the answer is hardly obvious. Constitutions empower and constrain.
But these paper barriers never work perfectly. Human nature sug-
gests that there always will be violations of these constraints. Given
the relative ubiquity of these infractions, there is no reason to believe
that governments will refrain from violating a constitution when it re-
25 Of course, Professor Paulsen can always concede all of this, and argue that the
Constitution's makers had learned from their mistake and included a generic failsafe
in the Constitution. For the reasons discussed in the text, I doubt that they took this
route. The Framers solved the problems of the Articles not by including a generic
failsafe, but by conveying specific powers thought necessary for a sound federal
government.
26 See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1258. Even if one agreed wholeheartedly with
Professor Paulsen's view that a failsafe provision must be a part of any sound constitu-
tion, there remains the possibility that the Constitution's makers made a mistake. Be-
cause humans are fallible, it is always possible that the Constitution's makers failed to
include provisions that they intended to include, or would have included had the
omission been brought to their attention. I do not place much stock in this argu-
ment. I prefer to think that the Constitution's makers did not think it wise to include
a generic rule of necessity that permitted the suspension of the Constitution's seem-
ingly absolute limits. Still, framing error is a possibility.
13o8 [VOL. 79:4
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ally matters, i.e., when the future of the government is at stake. We
can expect that even when a constitution does not contain a rule of
necessity, its government nonetheless will do what it takes to keep it-
self intact. Citizens can then decide, after the fact, whether their
agents ought to be indemnified and/or forgiven for violating the Con-
stitution. This system of ex post "ratification" or excusal of constitu-
tional violations forces government officials to struggle with whether
the Constitution (or large portions of it) ought to be suspended in a
given circumstance. It also requires the House and Senate to exercise
judgment as to whether officials ought to be impeached and/or re-
moved for constitutional violations committed in the name of saving
the Constitution and/or the nation. This system mirrors a more tradi-
tional way of dealing with crises. Rather than straining to construe
away violations in situations where the violations seem justified by exi-
gent circumstances, this system does not shy away from finding a viola-
tion. Instead, it judges whether the violation ought to be excused.
If I am right about the nature of the Constitution (and Professor
Paulsen and President Lincoln are wrong), President Lincoln's un-
constitutional actions during the civil war proves my point about how
ostensibly suicidal constitutions really are not that suicidal in practice.
Despite the fact that the Constitution lacked a rule of necessity, Lin-
coln did what needed to be done to preserve the nation. In my view,
Lincoln's actions ought to be excused. But we ought not to delude
ourselves into thinking that Lincoln, in the course of saving the
Union, never violated the Constitution.
II. A PECULIAR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
The first instantiation of the Constitution of Necessity is the meta-
rule of construction-where possible avoid reading the Constitution
in a manner that would lead to its self-destruction. This rule seems
vaguely familiar, given that courts sporadically apply a rule of con-
struction that they will avoid construing statutes as if they were uncon-
stitutional. 2 7 For that reason, Professor Paulsen suggests that his rule
should not be overly controversial. The rule attempts to eschew read-
ings of the Constitution that would tend towards its destruction, some-
thing that he views as akin to being unconstitutional. Hence he
argues that his rule of construction is "equally, if not more, compel-
27 See, e.g, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 681 (2004)
("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and... a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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ling than the various" constitutional avoidance canons. 28 I don't
think the avoidance canons are that compelling, but in any event, the
meta-rule of construction seems quite far removed from the more
conventional avoidance canons.
Rules of construction, once applied, yield what we might call a
fixed, constructed meaning. Given the rule against implied repeals, 29
we might conclude that a more recent statute does not repeal a prior
statute. This meaning will not change whatever the future might
bring. No matter the changed circumstances, we will not read the
more recent statute as repealing the older statute. Likewise, if we con-
strue a statute in such a manner so as to avoid raising a difficult consti-
tutional issue, we will not revisit the resulting meaning at some later
point. Application of these (and other) traditional rules of construc-
tion generates fixed meanings.
In sharp contrast, Professor Paulsen's meta-rule contemplates va-
riable, contextual "meanings." Take a war power example. Professor
Paulsen suggests that in today's context, where instant nuclear incin-
eration is an ever-present threat, the meta-rule of construction effec-
tively operates to allow the President to unilaterally wage a preemptive
war.30 This is so even though Professor Paulsen believes that absent
the meta-rule of construction, the better constitutional reading is that
the President cannot commence military hostilities without congres-
sional approval. Apparently, Professor Paulsen contemplates that his
meta-rule of construction only applies in emergency contexts. In
other words, it does not apply to determine the general meaning of
the relevant war powers clauses, it only applies to determine their
emergency meaning. But all this implies that the war powers provi-
sions did not authorize presidential warmaking prior to the advent of
the nuclear age, because in the pre-atomic era, there was no rule of
necessity reason for the President to have the power to start a war. It
also implies that, should we ever develop a device to render nuclear
devices impotent, the meta-rule would no longer apply and control of
war initiation would revert to the Congress. In effect, his fact-sensitive
application of the meta-rule of construction means that the provisions
in question have at least two meanings, one ordinary meaning and
one emergency danger meaning.
28 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1269.
29 See, e.g, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978) (noting the
"cardinal rule" against implied repeals in the absence of "some affirmative showing of
[the legislature's] intention to repeal") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
30 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1272-73.
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Multiple meanings are not the result of an interpretive choice
that Professor Paulsen may abandon. They are instead an artifact of
his meta-rule of construction. His meta-rule is simply incapable of es-
tablishing a fixed meaning for ambiguous provisions. If what matters
is the preservation of the Constitution and nation, ambiguity must al-
ways be read in favor of self-preservation. But one can easily construct
hypotheticals where self-preservation will require the exact opposite
interpretations of a single provision. Consider Lincoln's suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. Professor Paulsen lauds Lincoln's action
as necessary to save the nation. 31 Yet if enough states subsequently
became alarmed by the prospect of presidential suspension of habeas
corpus, these states could demand that the Habeas Corpus Clause be
read the way Chief Justice Roger Taney read it-as only countenanc-
ing congressional suspension. To back up this demand, these states
could threaten to secede from the Union if they do not get their way.
If self-preservation requires the Taney reading under these circum-
stances, then Lincoln's reading becomes wrong even though it was
once right.32
In the Paulsenian view, ambiguous clauses at most have a contin-
gent meaning that changes with the circumstances. Yet the better,
conventional view is that the meaning of text does not change in dif-
ferent contexts unless the text itself provides some reason for believ-
ing the meaning might change. Neither the habeas suspension
provision nor the war powers provisions provide any clue that they
mean different things depending upon what is necessary to preserve
the nation. And hence the question arises: Must we subscribe to a
living, chameleon Constitution in order to avoid the greater evil of a
suicidial one?
If my argument is correct, Professor Paulsen's meta-rule of con-
struction is unlike any known rule of construction. Indeed, one might
fairly question whether we need to create a new term to describe the
work done by Professor Paulsen's interpretive rule. None of this
shows that the meta-rule is wrong or that we ought to reject it, but it
does suggest that Professor Paulsen bears a heavy burden in establish-
31 Id. at 1269-72.
32 Professor Paulsen's meta-rule of construction is akin to a rule that requires that
we adopt constructions of the Constitution that are conducive to economic growth.
We might then conclude that governmental power ought to expand during a depres-
sion and contract during expansionary times. In the former situation, aggressive gov-
ernmental intervention in the economy might foster economic growth; in the latter,
aggressive governmental intervention might retard growth. But any "economic
growth rule of construction" seems more like a contrivance than anything resembling
a conventional rule of construction.
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ing the meta-rule because he contemplates an interpretive rule with
no seeming analog.
Apart from the singular nature of the meta-rule, there also is the
question of the provenance of the meta-rule. For an originalist, inter-
pretive rules of whatever sort might apply to the Constitution in one
of two ways. The Constitution itself might codify a rule of construc-
tion, or the Constitution might have been enacted against a set of
accepted, background interpretive rules governing the manner in
which it would be interpreted. The Tenth Amendment is an example
of the former, and the use of eighteenth century English as the me-
dium of communication is an example of the latter. I am not sure
whether Professor Paulsen relies upon either type of argument to es-
tablish the meta-rule. Although he cites the Oath Clause quite fre-
quently, he does not apparently argue that the clause actually
establishes the meta-rule. The clause establishes a duty and seems a
poor candidate for an interpretive rule generator. Nor does he claim
that the meta-rule was simply a well known background rule of inter-
pretation such that it was understood to be part of the Constitution
thought not explicitly made part of it.
If I am not mistaken, the meta-rule of construction seems to be
based on nothing more than the proposition that the Constitution
would be a better constitution if we assumed it contained a rule of
necessity. But the same could be said of an economic growth meta-
rule of construction (construe the Constitution to maximize gross do-
mestic product) or many other interpretive devices that we might
favor. Of course, Professor Paulsen is free to advocate the use of an
extra-constitutional rule of construction. But if I am right that Profes-
sor Paulsen really does not believe that the meta-rule arises out of the
Constitution itself, he ought to admit that the meta-rule lacks an
originalist basis and is instead merely a desirable (or in his view, abso-
lutely necessary) rule of construction.
III. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND THE FAUSAFE
Professor Paulsen concludes that both the President and Con-
gress may act to preserve the Constitution and the nation.33 But he
sees a special role for the executive, for only it takes an oath "to pre-
serve, protect and defend" the Constitution.3 4 As Professor Paulsen
correctly notes, the oath is not a source of power as much as it is a
33 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1291-92. If I am not mistaken, Professor Paulsen
limits the judiciary to a checking role on the President's exercise of executive power
and on the Congress's exercise of the Necessary and Proper power.
34 Id. at 1291.
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duty.35 The powers which the President must use to preserve, protect,
and defend must come from elsewhere. Professor Paulsen argues that
the President's executive power enables him to take emergency mea-
sures to suspend constitutional constraints, such as the prohibition on
abridging the freedom of speech, which might get in the way of pre-
serving the Constitution and the nation as a whole.
The plausibility of Professor Paulsen's claim, it seems to me, must
ultimately rest upon the historical understanding of executive power
at the time of the Constitution's founding. Nonetheless, constitu-
tional text and structure give us several reasons to doubt his rule of
necessity. Let us first consider his claims about congressional power
to suspend constitutional provisions. Professor Paulsen believes that
the Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to pass laws that
make it possible for the Constitution and nation to continue, even at
the expense of other constitutional provisions. 36 He also contends
that Congress can use this power specifically to carry into execution
the President's emergency powers. 37 The second proposition de-
pends upon the correctness of his claim about executive power. I will
have more to say about the correctness of the underlying claim in a
moment.
The first proposition, however, seems wrong to me. For Congress
to rely upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, it has to be carrying
into execution some other power of government. After all, this clause
does not grant a free-standing power, but instead allows Congress to
legislate in support of powers granted elsewhere by the Constitution.
If that is so, the clause certainly cannot serve as an independent font
of authority to create emergency exceptions. For instance, should
Congress suspend the First Amendment, it is hard to see what federal
power Congress thereby helps carry into execution. It cannot be an
emergency or failsafe power, for that would be to assume the exis-
tence of the very power that is doubted. Moreover, the Necessary and
Proper Clause contains an independent requirement that all exercises
of the clause must be "proper."38 It is far from clear why it would be
"proper" to use the clause as a means of vitiating or suspending consti-
tutional constraints such as the right to freedom of religion. If the
clause grants Congress independent authority to suspend constitu-
tional provisions, it does so rather surreptitiously and clumsily.
35 Id. at 1263 n.14.
36 Id. at 1292.
37 Id.
38 U.S. CONSY. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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The claimed presidential necessity power lies at the heart of Pro-
fessor Paulsen's argument. Yet it too seems problematic. Like Paul-
sen, I also believe that the Executive Power Clause grants the
President authorities beyond those listed in Article II. The question
is, what are those powers? One of those powers, in fact the essential
meaning of the executive power, is the power to execute the laws. 39 A
duty that modifies this power is the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
In my view, it would be odd to require faithful execution of the laws
while simultaneously authorizing the suspension of constitutional pro-
visions. Yet it is this jarring juxtaposition that Paulsen finds in the
executive power. Under the Paulsenian constitution, the executive
power both authorizes law execution and constitution suspension. In
fact, the executive must faithfully execute the law and also must faith-
fully suspend the Constitution if doing so would save the nation and/
or the Constitution.
Although Professor Paulsen abjures reliance on the Oath Clause
as a source of presidential power, he does suggest that the President
must have some power to ensure that the oath is not some cruel, im-
possible hoax. 40 There simply must be some other clause that grants
the President the means to preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution. But there is a more reasonable, straightforward reading of the
Oath Clause, one that does not require or even suggest that the Presi-
dent must have all the means he judges necessary for preserving, pro-
tecting, and defending the Constitution. The Oath Clause does not
imply a right to unlimited resources and a power to sweep away any-
one or anything (including constitutional provisions) that stand in the
way of preserving, protecting, and defending. Indeed, if Professor
Paulsen took an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion, no one would argue that his oath was meaningless absent an
ability on Professor Paulsen's part to take whatever measures he
deemed necessary to safeguard the Constitution. It has meaning and
is not some cruel hoax, whether or not Professor Paulsen has an army
and unlimited funds at his beck and call.
The better view is that the clause merely requires that the Presi-
dent use whatever resources he has at his disposal to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution. If the Congress does not grant him an
army and navy, the President must stand guard alone, because he can-
not raise armies and navies on his own. Likewise, if the Congress does
not supply enough subordinate executives to carry on his executive
tasks, the President must faithfully execute the law to the best of his
39 See generally Prakash, supra note 11.
40 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1263.
[VOL- 79:41314
CONSTITUTION AS SUICIDE PACT
abilities given his limited resources. Fulfill your twin duties (protect-
ing the Constitution and faithfully executing the laws) with whatever
resources you have, Mr. President.4'
As noted earlier, there are structural reasons to doubt the rule of
necessity. Because the Constitution contains numerous specific and
explicit emergency provisions, there is reason to doubt that it also
grants the President a cross-cutting power to suspend various provi-
sions. For instance, the Third Amendment forbids the quartering of
soldiers in times of war except in a manner prescribed by law.
42
Under Paulsen's rule of necessity, however, the President could quar-
ter soldiers in times of peace or war, in a way contrary to the manner
prescribed by a law. Indeed, even if there was no law permitting quar-
tering of soldiers in wartime, the President could suspend the Third
Amendment and quarter. May the President completely disregard the
Third Amendment's quite specific limitations on quartering? The
rule of necessity says yes.
Or consider the Fifth Amendment, which states, inter alia, that
no person will be held to answer for an infamous crime except on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury.43 The only exception is
for cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger."44 One would have to
regard the exception as wholly superfluous because the rule of neces-
sity implicitly appends a similar exception to each and every constitu-
tional constraint.
More generally, Paulsen's rule of necessity effectively creates a
constitution-wide balancing test. No constitutional provision is abso-
lute. Yet this flies in the face of the varying ways in which constitu-
tional constraints are crafted. Some provisions invite (almost
demand) a balancing approach, thereby loosening their constraints in
dangerous times. What constitutes a reasonable search will vary with
whether we are at peace or at war. 45 If the nation has been invaded,
invasive and intrusive searches and seizures seem quite justified. In
this way, the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment varies de-
41 This argument about the Oath Clause does not prove that Professor Paulsen's
argument about executive power is wrong. But to the extent that his reading of the
Oath Clause somehow helps bolster or prove his executive power claim, the alterna-
tive reading of the Oath Clause does undermine his overall argument.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. 11I.
43 Id. amend. V.
44 Id.
45 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..... Id.
amend. IV (emphasis added).
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pending upon context. Likewise, what may seem excessive or cruel in
peacetime may be absolutely necessary in emergency situations. In
this way, the application of the Eighth Amendment varies with the
context.
46
Other constitutional constraints do not seem so flexible. The
prohibition against expending funds without an appropriation does
not seem to admit an emergency exception. 47 The prohibition
against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder likewise apparently
brooks no loophole.48 Finally, do we think that Congress can, in the
face of an emergency, define treason as saying nasty but true things
against the government, despite the careful crafting of the Treason
Clause?49 The better reading of the Constitution is that while some
constraints may be loosened in emergencies, other constraints are
meant to be fixed in stone. The Paulsenian constitution, with its rule
of necessity, contemplates that all constraints may constrain so long as
they do not constrain too much. And that is a dangerous proposition,
for constraints are often most useful and necessary precisely when we
would rather ignore them.
One final argument strikes at the core of the claim that the Con-
stitution was meant to last forever and ever. To Paulsen, it is unthink-
able that constitution-makers would make constitutions that lack the
ability to endure in perpetuity.50 Hence arises the imperative for max-
imum flexibility in any sensible constitution. But a comparison of the
Articles of Confederation with the Constitution suggests that the Con-
stitution's makers were not laboring under the delusion that their
Constitution would last forever. In no less than five places, the Arti-
cles proclaim that it creates a "perpetual Union." As is well known the
Articles lasted less than a decade and their demise was foreseen almost
as soon as it was ratified. Perhaps recognizing the futility of trying to
create a perpetual framework, the Constitution merely creates a
"more perfect Union,"51 not one that is perpetual and perfect. In the
eyes of the Framers, the Constitution was undoubtedly much better
46 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. amend. VIII.
47 "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appro-
priations made by Law." Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
48 "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
49 "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
50 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1258.
51 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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than the Articles ("more perfect"). But it is almost impossible to be-
lieve that the Constitution's makers envisioned that the Constitution
would establish a perpetual framework, especially given the early de-
mise of the prior framework and given that they eschewed language
scattered throughout the Articles that indicated a desire for an
everlasting framework. I do not believe that the Constitution's fram-
ers had such hubris.
IV. HISTORY AND THE FAILSAFE
As noted earlier, if a rule of necessity empowers the executive, it
must exist because of a historical understanding that executives had
the power to take emergency measures to save the country in times of
peril. Professor Paulsen cites Abraham Lincoln's actions and argu-
ments during the Civil War as support for the rule of necessity.5 2 Yet
Lincoln's actions and arguments are not very sound evidence of any
original meaning. Lincoln was born well after 1789 and he made his
fateful decisions some three score and fourteen years after the Consti-
tution's birth. We must look to earlier periods if we are to find proper
evidence of the original meaning of the executive power.
I know of no evidence from the Founding era that the President
(or any other branch for that matter) was regarded as possessing a
generic power to suspend the Constitution. Indeed, I do not know of
anyone who even discussed the issue. What we do know is that there is
evidence from English history suggesting the lack of a law suspension
power. An explicit constraint on the English executive was the English
Bill of Right's prohibition on suspending or dispensing the law.53 The
English monarch had suspended a series of laws designed to preclude
Catholics from serving in the government. To suspend these laws was
to nullify them, leaving them with no force. Parliament was none too
pleased with these suspensions, and it prohibited them in the Bill of
Rights.54 Several early state constitutions included analogues to these
prohibitions. Despite the lack of an explicit prohibition in the federal
Constitution, it seems clear that the federal executive power in 1787
was not regarded as including the power to suspend lawful statutes
(whether it permitted the President to ignore unconstitutional laws is
another question). Given this background, it seems unlikely that the
Constitution granted the President a much more consequential power
of suspending the Constitution itself.
52 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1263-67.
53 See ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (U.K. 1689), available at http://www.yale.edu/law
web/avalon/england.htm.
54 See id.
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The affections and primary loyalties of Americans in 1787 also
suggest that the continued existence of the Constitution was not fore-
most in their minds. People more often considered themselves as
"Virginians" or "New Yorkers" rather than Americans. That being the
case, they might not have agreed to a provision that would have made
it possible for the interests of the states to have been discarded in the
name of preserving the Constitution or the nation. Would Rhode Is-
landers loyal to their "Island" be willing to authorize suspension of all
the constraints on enumerated powers or the equal state suffrage in
the Senate? There were enough people who voted against the Consti-
tution in the state conventions to suggest that preservation of the na-
tion was not the ultimate goal of many Americans. After all, those
who voted against the Constitution knew that their states might not
remain part of the United States of America had their side prevailed.
And of those who favored the Constitution, it is far from clear that
they would have favored it had it contained an explicit rule of neces-
sity that imperiled the provisions that they favored.
None of this precludes the possibility of building an impressive
historical case for an emergency constitutional suspension power. But
one would have to examine the Revolutionary War (and wars occur-
ring in close proximity to the Constitution's founding) rather than
the Civil War, and determine whether executives (and the govern-
ment) generally believed that they were empowered to suspend con-
stitutional constraints. It is not enough that these executives might
have violated constitutional constraints; constitutional violations are
common events and are even more common in times of war. Instead,
we would need to find evidence that people recognized that the gover-
nors were empowered to suspend constraints-that the steps taken
were understood as authorized rather than as constitutional viola-
tions. I doubt that this is Professor Paulsen's final word on this sub-
ject, and so perhaps he will pursue this task at some point in the
future.
CONCLUSION
Does the Constitution contain mini rules of necessity? It is be-
yond dispute that the Constitution contains provisions that grant the
government extra flexibility in times of war or crisis. For example, the
Fifth Amendment applies differently in wartime, 55 as does the Third
55 This amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
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Amendment.56 Moreover, the government likely enjoys increased
subject matter powers in times of war. The war power arguably in-
cludes the power to adopt a war footing where some of the normal
enumerated power constraints do not apply. Likewise, the com-
mander in chief probably can do more (as a matter of constitutional
law) in times of war than he can in peacetime. But all this is a far cry
from a claim that in times of crisis the President and/or Congress may
suspend the entire Constitution. The text and structure suggest that
no entity within the federal government has such power, and the his-
torical case for it has yet to be made.
Does this mean that the Constitution is a suicide pact? Not in the
sense that the Constitution was meant to fail. A suicide pact is an
agreement where parties agree to end their lives together. I do not
think the Constitution was so understood. Undoubtedly, people write
constitutions hoping that they will succeed, if not in perpetuity, at
least for the long haul. But if by suicide pact Professor Paulsen means
that the Constitution merely does not include a rule of necessity, then
I think the Constitution is a suicide pact.
57
Professor Paulsen's reading of the Constitution brings to mind
the M-5 computer of the original Star Trek series. In The Ultimate Com-
puter,58 M-5-believing that it was under attack-fired upon other star-
ships that were engaged in mock battle exercises. Tojustify its attacks,
the computer remorselessly droned that "this unit must survive." It
had been impressed with the trait of self-preservation by its creator,
the brilliant yet crazed Doctor Richard Daystrom.
But the M-5 unit had also been programmed to value human life
and to avoid killing. This command eventually trumped the seem-
when in actual service in time of War or public danger.. U.S. CONST. amend. V (em-
phasis added).
56 "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id.
amend. III (emphasis added).
57 Professor Paulsen is clearly playing a little fast and loose with the conventional
meaning of suicide pact. No one would regard a simple contract between two parties
as a "suicide pact" if the pact did not contemplate its perpetual existence. Most con-
tracts end at some point and most contracts are not regarded as suicide pacts. The
same can be said for social compacts, like constitutions. We ought not regard a con-
stitution with a sunset provision as a suicide pact merely because the constitution does
not envision that it will last forever. Similarly, we ought not regard the U.S. Constitu-
tion as a true suicide pact merely if we conclude it does not contain the rule of
necessity.
58 For a brief synopsis of this episode, see StarTrek.com, The Ultimate Computer, at
http://www.startrek.com/startrek/view/series/TOS/episode/68 7 66 .html (last visited
May 23, 2004).
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ingly iron-clad rule of self-preservation. If Daystrom's "perfect" com-
puter recognized values higher than self-preservation, why not our
Constitution? Is it so hard to believe that when the Constitution's
makers forbade Congress from passing bills of attainder, they really
meant to establish an absolute prohibition, not one that could be
waived in some exigency, including the very exigencies where people
would be most likely to succumb to the temptation to pass a bill of
attainder? Some would argue that a system that values self-preserva-
tion at all costs is a suicide of another sort, for the system sacrifices all
other ideals on the false altar of survival.
